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Summary findings
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monopoly  running  the concession  and  for  the two  all service  users.
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During  the 1990s,  investment  in utility  projects  associated  with some  form  of
privatization  added  up to about  US$470  billion  in developing  countries.  This
figure reflects  investment  commitments  made through  almost 1500 contracts
between governments and  private operators in  the  context of  major
infrastructure  restructuring  programs.  The contracts,  most of them concession
contracts,  were generally  awarded  through auctions  to  make the most of
competition  for the market  ex ante and minimize  the need for discretionary
regulatory  decisions  ex post (Crampes  and Estache  (1998)). An  ongoing
analysis  of a sample  of 1000  utilities  and  transport  contracts  signed  during  the
1990s  (Guasch  (2001))  suggests  that renegotiation  happens  in around  50%  of
the cases.  Moreover,  it suggests  that the odds  of renegotiations  are the highest
when  the auction  criteria  is driven  by the desire  to minimize  the average  tariff  to
be paid  by users  of the services  bided  out. More  generally,  the difficulty  is often
related  to a poor initial  effort  to assess  the sources  of demand  fluctuations,  often
related  to a limited  ability  to pay  of a good  share  of  the population.
These  stylized  facts  define  the policy  issues  this paper  is concerned  with. If
awarding  the contract  to the bidder  promising  to cut the most  the average  tariff
leads  to renegotiations,  it seems  fair to be concerned  with the possibility  that
renegotiation  will end  up increasing  tariffs  and  penalizing  the  poorest.  The main
purpose  of this  paper  is to check  for some  of the conditions  under  which  there  is
an efficiency-equity  trade-off  in the context of contract  renegotiation  and to
identify  the winners  and the losers of various  policy options  in a changing
political  environment.
Section 2  highlights the  main results of  the  literature on  contract
incompleteness  and renegotiation  and shows  that the equity dimension  has
essentially  been left out so far from  the discussion.  Section  3 presents  a model
of contract  award  through  an auction.  In view of the experience  of the last
decade,  the possibility  of renegotiation  is explicitly  recognized  as part of the
initial  contract  preparation.  Renegotiation  can be driven  either  by the firm, in
which case it will happen if  the firm's profits are negative, or  by the
government,  in which case it will occur if a new group is in power at the
renegotiation  stage. To also take into account the  possible influence  of
distributional  issues in the context of renegotiation,  we assume that the
economy  is composed  by  two groups  of consumers,  rich and  poor,  who  alternate
in power  according  to a majority-voting  rule. In Section  4 we solve  the model
2and  we  obtain  the  characteristics  of  the  winning  firm  and  those  of  the
renegotiated  price.  Section  5 analyzes  the  results  in terms  of efficiency  and
equity trade-offs. Section 6 concludes.
2.  Renegotiation and contract incompleteness
Renegotiation  and contract incompleteness are quite related  in the literature.
The  single possibility  of renegotiation  implies  some incompleteness,  because
the  parties  are not  able to  commit  not to  renegotiate.  But  even this  kind  of
incompleteness  is not enough  to explain why renegotiation  occurs  in the  real
world.  Indeed, the renegotiation-proof  principle states that  any outcome  that a
principal  can get can be achieved through  a contract that  leaves  no  room for
renegotiation.
Unfortunately,  there  is  no  unique  framework  under  which  contract
incompleteness  can be analyzed.  Tirole  (1999) summarizes  the  main  reasons
that could generate  incomplete  contracts. He mentions basically three  reasons.
First,  some  contingencies  that  may arise  during the  execution  of the  contract
cannot be foreseen when the contract is signed. Second, even if the parties could
anticipate all the possible contingencies that should be included in the contract,
they  might  be  so  numerous  that  the  costs  of  describing  them  all  can  be
prohibitive.  In that case,  the  parties have  to trade  off the  benefit  of having  a
more comprehensive  contract with the cost of writing new clauses. Finally, the
contract  can only be contingent  on  variables that  could be verified  by a third
party, usually  an arbitration commission or a Regulatory  Agency in the context
of infrastructure "privatization"  contracts. If this were not the case, the contract
would not be enforceable.
A  seminal paper  on  renegotiation  and  incomplete  information  is Hart  and
Moore (1988). In their model they assume that actions and future contingencies
are all ex post observable, but they are not verifiable by a third party. They show
that  in  that  case  the  parties  cannot  achieve  an  ex  ante  optimal  level  of
investment and renegotiation  is used to achieve ex post efficiency.
On  the  other  hand,  Aghion  et  al.  (1994)  argues  that  the  assumption  of
unverifiability  is  not  enough  to  explain  under-investment.  Very  often,  this
problem  can  be  overcome  with  an  appropriate  ex  ante  design  of  the
renegotiation  process  itself. In their model, playing with the default option and
the  bargaining  power at  the renegotiation  stage restores efficiency  even when
actions are not verifiable.
3Closer to the model presented here are the papers of Jeon and Laffont (1999)
and  Kartacheva  and  Quesada  (2000).  Jeon  and  Laffont  (1999)  modeled  a
government regulating a firm under some uncertainty conditions on the demand
faced by the firm and its fixed cost. They assume that both the government and
the firm are myopic and are not able to anticipate future renegotiations. Ex post,
if the profit  of the  firm  is negative,  the regulatory contract is renegotiated. In
this context, renegotiation occurs more often when the firm is inefficient, which
is not always the case in our model.
Finally, Kartacheva and Quesada (2000) assume a government auctioning the
concession of some public utility. Firms anticipate that renegotiation will occur
if demand is low and take this fact into account at the auction stage. Firms know
that if profits are negative the government will prefer to renegotiate rather than
to  stop  production  and  they  will  face  no  competition  at  that  point.  As  a
consequence,  the  announced  bid will  be biased  downward  given that  a  firm
expects  renegotiation  if it makes losses. Furthermore,  different  firms can have
different  degrees  of bargaining  power  at the  renegotiation  stage. Both effects
give  incentives for firms to announce a bid lower than the one that would have
been  announced without  the possibility of renegotiation.  This  implies also that
the ex post probability of renegotiation is higher.
This  paper  differs  from  the  previous  ones  in that  we  allow  here  to  have
renegotiation  both  driven by the  firm  and  by the  government.  Of course,  the
outcome  of renegotiation  will be different in one case or in the other. Moreover,
we allow in our model to have two different types of consumers and, therefore,
we  are  able  to  analyze  how  renegotiation  affects  differently  each  of these
groups.
3.  The model
The government  wants to concession a public utility. To choose the firm to
operate the  concession,  it runs  an auction  and  chooses  the  firm that  bids the
lowest price. The chosen firm will produce for two periods. We are not looking
for  the  optimal  auction  from the  government's  perspective  and  consider  the
mechanism as given. Indeed, we will assume that both the government and the
firm  are  naive  in  game-theoretical  sense,  meaning  that  future  stages  are  not
taken  into account when  a  decision  or action  is undertaken.  In this  particular
case, it means that the government does not consider or does not care about the
possibility  of renegotiation  when designing the  auction and that neither do the
firms when deciding on the bid. This limited rationality on the agents' behavior
4is what allows renegotiation to happen in equilibrium. Indeed, without such
naYve  agents, renegotiation would not be  an  issue. This behavior may be
explained in several ways. It may be the case that the agents overestimate their
commitment  power. More realistically,  from the view point of the government,
what may matter more is that the political cycles are much shorter than the
typical concession contract duration and more often than not, the political
turnover is such that the "privatizing  team" of a government  is no longer  around
when  renegotiation takes place  and  hence has  little  incentive to  be  too
concerned about it. From the viewpoint  of the operator,  being naYve  may simply
reflect overconfidence  in their ability to get anything they want from a weak
government  or regulator and is hence perceived  as a no risk attitude towards the
market.
On the supply side, each firm i is characterized  by two parameters.  The first
parameter is its marginal cost of production 0, E ~,O] and is firm i's  private
information.  The second parameter is the bargaining  power the firm would have
whenever renegotiation  occurs, a,  E [0,1]  and is ex ante unknown  to anyone but
would become common knowledge  at the renegotiation  stage. To simplify, we
assume that all 9i are independent  and identically  distributed  with a cumulative
distribution  function F(9 1) and  probability density  function AOi).  The profit of
firm i is x, = (p - 0i) q(p) - I, where  p is the price of the public utility,  q(p) is the
demand function  and I is a fixed cost.
We consider an increasing return to  scale production technology with  a
constant marginal  cost. The assumption  of a constant marginal  cost is made just
to simplify computations  and all our results will still be valid with a more
general cost function of the form C(q(p), 01)  with  Xlo/di < 0. At the auction
stage, the only difference  across firms is the marginal cost. Therefore, a firm
with a low value of 0 (a low marginal cost) is unambiguously  more efficient
than another firm with a larger 9. On the other hand, the bargaining  power, ai, is
statistically independent of  the  marginal cost  of  production,  9i, and  is
independently drawn  from  a  cumulative distribution function G(ai)  with
probability density function g(a,). Alternatively, one could assume that each
firm knows its own parameter a,,  but this would complicate  the equilibrium of
the auction procedure,  without adding  much to the analysis.
On the demand  side, we assume that there are two groups  of consumers.  The
first group (indexed by 1), the rich consumers, appropriates  all the rents of the
firm, whereas the second group (indexed by 2), the poor consumers, does not
share the profits of the firm. The proportion of rich consumers is f,  e [0,1].
5Both groups of consumers alternate in government  depending on whether  Plf  is
larger or smaller than 1/2. That is, if />  1/2 then rich consumers are a majority
and they are in power. On the other hand, if ,l  < 1/2, poor consumers are
majority. We will call S(q) the gross consumer  utility and u(q) = S(q) -pq  the
net utility. The demand function is then determined by utility maximization,
which implies that, ifp is the price of the good, q(p) is such that S'(q(p)) =p.
The utility function is stochastic in such a way that q(p) = q(p) + £,  where
E  eU[-e,  ] is a demand shock and q(p)  is the mean demand function. We
also assume that once the demand function is realized it remains the same in
both periods. That is, at the end of the first period, when renegotiation can
happen, the demand  for the second  period is perfectly  known.
A rich majority will want to maximize its own surplus, Wl. They receive a
proportion fi( of  the total  net utility and all  the firm's  profits, therefore
WI = /[S(q(p))  - pq(p)] +  iz  =  ,8*S(q(p))  + (I - ,8*)pq(p)  - &iq(p)  - I.  On  the
other  hand,  a  poor  majority will  maximize  W 2 = (1 - fi)[S(q(p)) -pq(p)],
because they get only a proportion  of the total net utility equal to (I -,/3). Any
group has to take into account the constraint  that the profits of the firm are non-
negative  for the firm to be willing  to produce.
Finally, we assume that after production,  the profits of the firm are perfectly
observable by  the  government and,  therefore, renegotiation occurs under
complete information. Both the profit and the demand are observed by the
government  and therefore the marginal  cost, 0,,  can be inferred.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1.  Each firm i learns  its private information,  0,.
2.  A first-price sealed-bid auction is run and each firm chooses a price to sell
the good, pi. The firm with the lowest bid wins the auction and is selected  to
produce  the good for 2 periods.
3.  The actual demand is realized and is observed by the government and the
firm.
4.  The first period of production  ends and the firm and the government  observe
the first period profit of the firm.
5.  If the profit is negative the firm asks the government to renegotiate the
contract. If there is a new majority and the price that can be obtained when
6renegotiating  is  smaller  than  the  actual  price,  the  government  asks  for
renegotiation.  We assume that at this stage both the government and the firm
are locked in the relationship. We model renegotiation as a Nash bargaining
game with bargaining powers ai for the firm and I - a, for the government.
6.  If an agreement is reached, the firm runs the concession in the second period
R with a new price, p  . Both the government and the firm will get 0 if there  is
no agreement.
7.  If there is no renegotiation, the original contract prevails.
Note that we assume that the firm only asks for renegotiations when profits
are  negative.  The  reason  is  the  following.  Suppose  that  the  firm  asks  for
renegotiations  when it is making positive  profits because  it expects to increase
the  price.  If  the  government  rejects  the  offer,  the  firm  can  either  leave  the
market and get 0 (its outside option) or stay and get some positive profit. So the
government  knows that the firm will always stay and, therefore, will reject any
renegotiation  that increases the price.
On the other hand, if the majority does not change in the second period, there
is no  renegotiation  driven by the government. So we are assuming that there  is
some limited commitment  on the government  side. A given group can commit
not to renegotiate as long as it is in power and the firm is not making losses, but
is not able neither to force a new group not to renegotiate nor to oblige a firm to
stay  in  the  market  when  profits  are  negative.  So,  in terms  of  commitment
power, our model is lies in between the stylized cases presented in Laffont and
Tirole  (1993),  namely,  full-commitment,  one  period-commitment  and
commitment only when no renegotiation  is mutually beneficial.
4.  Optimal bidding and renegotiation
In this  section  we  will  look  for  the  solution  of the  auction  game  and  its
implications  on  the  renegotiation  process.  Because  we  assume  that  firms  are
myopic  in the sense that they do not consider the possibility of renegotiation  at
the auction  stage, we start by solving the equilibrium  of the first-price  sealed-
bid auction, considering that a firm, if it wins, will produce for two periods with
the same price.
74.1  First stage: solution of the first-price sealed-bid auction
We look for a symmetric  Bayesian  Nash equilibrium  of the auction in which
each firm bids according  to a function  pi =p(O), increasing  in 0,.
So, the objective  function  of firm i can be written as
max  y(p, )2E, [(p, -0  Xq(pJ  )  + 2)-  I]
Pi
where  yp,)  is  the  probability  of  winning  the  auction.  Therefore,
Api)_=Pr  (pi  < pj,Vj  i). Because we want to  find the Nash equilibrium we
assume that all the firms but i are playing  the equilibrium  strategy,  and we look
for the best response of firm i. After that, we will check that, indeed, there is a
symmetric  equilibrium  and the function  p(Oi)  is increasing.
Because all the other firms are bidding according to the function p(9 3),
Vj ￿  i,  we  have  that  {pi)  _ Pr (pi <p( g),Vj  ]  i).  Now,  because p(0j)  is
increasing it can be inverted so that Oj  = p-  l (pj). So firm i will win the auction
if,  Vj￿i,  O9>9,=p- 1 (pi). Thus,  7{p,)=Pr(p-l(pi)<9j,Vj j ￿i).  Using the
assumption  of independence  of Oj,  )fpi)  = [1  - F(p - I (pi))]  N-  1, with N being the
number  of firms participating  in the auction.
Thus, firm i's objective  function  writes:
maxIj-F(p_'(pi))r  2EJ[(pj -0J 1Xq(p;)+)-I]  (1)
Proposition 1 The winning firm  is the most efficient one in the pool.'  The
expected profit  of  the  winning firm  is  strictly positive  at  the  symmetric
equilibrium  for  any finite N and for N Ž 2, the winning bid is lower than the
monopoly  price.
Proof. See appendix.
Because the firm does not take into account that an ex post renegotiation
with the government  could increase the price in the second period the first-price
sealed-bid auction succeeds in selecting the most efficient firm to produce the
good. The intuition is that given the price of the good, a more efficient firm has
always higher profits, and therefore is willing to reduce a little bit its bid in
But not necessarily  the most efficient  in an absolute  sense.
8order to increase  the probability  of winning  the auction. This will always  be true
as long as firms are symmetric  in the sense that all marginal  costs are drawn
from the same distribution  function.  More generally,  if the firms' marginal  costs
are drawn from different distribution  functions  or if they were correlated  with a
known ai,  the concession  may be awarded  to a firm whose marginal cost is not
the lowest  one in the sample.
On the other  hand, competition  at this stage implies that the price of the good
is smaller than the monopoly price,  pM (9, W), but larger than the Ramsey
price,  pP(9,,s)  defined  such  that  (pP(9  g  )j(pP(0X,E)+  E )= I
computed at W  = 0.  Remember that our assumption of  increasing returns to
scale implies that competition  in the market is not desirable.  Moreover, the fact
that total costs are not observable  ex-ante by the government  makes regulation
by average cost pricing  (or Ramsey  pricing) impossible.  Therefore,  the best way
to avoid ex ante monopoly  pricing is to introduce competition for the market.
The benefits are illustrated  in Proposition 1: In order to increase the probability
of winning the auction firms prefer to charge a price lower than the monopoly
price.  Furthermore, as  the  number of  firms  participating in  the  auction
increases,  the price converges  to the Ramsey  price.
4.2 Renegotiation
There are two cases in which renegotiation  can happen in this model. In the
first case, the firm triggers renegotiation  if the demand shock is such that the
profit becomes negative. In the  second case, the government may trigger
renegotiation. A new government majority will ask for renegotiations  if these
can reduce the price.
4.2.1  Figuring out the changes in prices from  renegotiation.
Since the probability  of renegotiation  is influenced  by the resulting price, we
first need to see how the renegotiated  price depends on the bargaining  power of
the firm. Of course, this renegotiated  price will depend on the majority at the
renegotiation  stage.  The  appendix  shows  how  the  problem  is  solved
analytically.  In a nutshell, the optimal renegotiation  for each majority case will
result from the maximization by the new ruling majority of its own welfare
subject  to a positive constraint  on profits and taking into account  the strength  of
9its bargaining  power. The  first order conditions  of this  optimization  problem
yield the following result:
Proposition 2  (a) If  the rich win  the election for  the second period,  (i.e.
#2  >  1/2),  the renegotiatedprice is given by:
p1 -9,  i  WI  t  )+  ')'-a  1
R  1R)L  W  _a  r)  (0,1]  (2) Pi  I7p~  a,W(pR)+(1- 1 )2(p)
max{  (90,),Wp, (O,,')}fora,  = 0
where  pi (Oj, £ )  is such that
p1i  (Oi')-I  i  (  Il
;,*(0i  g)  =  (-  02  ;(  )
and ir(p) =  d- P)  P  > 0 is the demand  elasticity.
(b) If the  poor win the election (i.e.  fl2* <  1/2),  the renegotiatedprice is given
by:
P2 -S  aiW2  72  }  t})a  >2  ,  aE(0]
p2  2 ctaw 2 ()  (3)
P (09,  E)for  a  =0
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition  2 is quite intuitive and reasonable.  It means  that the renegotiated
price is a weighted average of the government's most preferred price and the
firm's  most  preferred price,  and  the  weights are  given by  each  party's
bargaining  power.
The extreme solutions of  this Nash bargaining game are actually quite
interesting as well. If  the firm has all  the bargaining power (a 1 = 1), the
renegotiated price is equal to the monopoly price. This is true whatever the
group in power. On the other extreme, when the government has  all the
bargaining power (ae  = 0), the renegotiated price will be equal to the Ramsey
10price (equal to the average cost) 2. These extremes define the upper and lower
bound for the renegotiated  price prevailing  under intermediate  values of ai.
The derivative of the first order conditions to  the optimization problem
yielding (2) and (3)-see  appendix for a  formal derivation- provides useful
additional information on how the effects of the changes in each one of the
"policy" parameters.  The most interesting  results are summarized  in:
Proposition 3. The comparative static results suggest that:
*  phRis  increasing  in I, 0,  and a, for  h = 1,2, meaning that,  ceteris paribus,
the renegotiated price  will be higher for  higher  levels of costs  (both fixed
and  marginal)  and for  higher  levels  of  bargaining  power  for  the firm,
keeping fixed  the  cost  of  the firm,  the larger  the bargaining  power,  the
closer the price  to the corresponding monopoly price.
*  p 2 Ris  constant in ,*  meaning that, whether I2  is slightly lower than  1/2  or
the  whole society  belongs to the poor  category,  the resulting price  will be
the same for  given values of I, ti and ai. So, things won 't get any better for
the poor  after  they renegotiate since under permanent  ruling  by the poor,
prices  are likely to be as low as possible from  the beginning.
*  piR  is decreasing  in  P2,  meaning  that  if there  is  a rich  majority  in the
second period,  the renegotiated price will be smaller  if the whole society  is
rich than if,  *  is slightly higher than 1/2.
*  For given values of the  parameters,  andfor any  *,  P2R <pR,  with equality
when a, = 1, meaning  that changing  majority from  the rich to the poor  will
result in lower tariff
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 1 summarizes the main results and illustrates how the renegotiated
price changes  with the proportion  of rich consumers.
2 If there is a majority  of rich consumers and fi2  is close to 1/2 it could be the case that  the
renegotiated  price for a, = 0 is larger than the Ramsey price, if the Ramsey price is smaller than
p,'.  But, of course, it will never be lower than the Ramsey price.
11. R
P2  pi
0  1/2  1
Figure 1: Renegotiated price as a function of  f
4.2.2  Figuring out who will initiate the renegotiation and when
Using  the  results  of  Proposition  2,  we  compute  the  probability  of
renegotiation  as  a  function  of  the  parameters  of  the  model.  Define
T  = Pr(J3 2 > 1/2 /  1,6  < 1/2) = Pr(#2* < 1/2 /  1,i  > 1/2) the probability of having
a new majority in period 2. For simplicity we assume that this probability is the
same, whether in the first period there is a rich majority or a poor majority.
The  total  probability  of  renegotiation  if  there  is  initially  a  majority  k
(Pr(R / k)) is then the sum of the probability  of renegotiation  driven by the firm
(Pr(Rf)) and  the  probability of  renegotiation  driven by  the  government,  given
that in the first period group k is in power (Pr(Rg  / k)):
Pr(R / k) = Pr(Rf) + Pr(Rg  / k)
Consider now separately the cases in which the firm and the government initiate
the renegotiation.
As explained before, the firm will ask for renegotiations when its profits  are
negative which means:
12Pr(R1 )=  Pr(,r(p)  < 0)
= Pr((p(O9  )-  0, Xq(p(O;  ))+ E ) < I)  (4)
=Pr 6<q  jO
P(Oi )-  i)
Define E (p(9i),  9)  E [- E, 0) such that
if  p(9  0}-)  e
-PTFI-  ( (n  ))  if  -8<  - iA()
So E gives the minimum demand shock that will allow the firm to make
positive profits and therefore the firm will not initiate  renegotiations  if i  2E.
With this  definition, Pr(R1)= Pr(- < g*  (P(9i )s  0 ))=  I +  f  because 2  2c  '
we have assumed a uniform distribution  for the demand  shock. The price bid in
the first period is higher than the Ramsey price for  E  =0,  so  <C0  and
Pr(Rf)  < 1/2. Therefore, only negative demand shocks can trigger renegotiation
by the firm.
The government  will ask for renegotiations  if there is a new majority, h # k,
which occurs with probability (p, and only when the price can be decreased,
which means  both that the profit of the firm is positive, so the firmn  can accept to
produce with a  lower price, and that its bargaining power is small enough,
because  the renegotiated  price increases  with ac.  Thus,
Pr(Rg / k)=  Pr(Majority h)Pr(;r 2  0)Pr(a,  <  h (0i, , p(O  )))
= 1 (  _  (P(Oi  ),  )'  (G  , p(0, )))p(5)
where  (h  (0i, p(O,))  is defined such that
Ph'  O8h  (0i,  P(oi  )))  =  p(oi)
So the renegotiated price will be lower than the initial price if and only if
a,  <  (h  (0i  I A0)
13From Proposition  2 we can find an expression for the maximum bargaining
power of the firm that will induce a new majority to ask for renegotiations.
R  R Indeed,  replacingpI  andp 2R byp(9i) in 2 and 3, and solving for ai, we obtain:
..  (?(P)P'p, i_  f  _  D)r(p1)
aa-=-  (6) (piPJE  -j(I  A2  i(Pj)+  _-@j)Pi)L-i  (Ai),
ae  -&2pj  (7)
2  02_  3  ()+(-  (p)  Pip' V(P)
where pi =p(0i).  So,  ah  is increasing inpi and decreasing  in Oi.
Because the renegotiated  price is always lower when there is a poor majority,
it can be shown that, given (p(9j),  6i),  &s  <  &2, meaning that, ceteris paribus,
Pr(Rg/1) > Pr(Rg/2), that  is, the probability  of renegotiation  is larger  if in the
first  period  the rich consumers were in power as illustrated by  Figure 2.
Intuitively, if the group of rich consumers is in power in period 1, then the
government can ask for renegotiations  only if in period 2 the group of poor
consumers becomes a majority. And whatever the bargaining power and the
marginal cost of the firm, bargaining with the group of poor consumers will
achieve a lower price than bargaining  with a group of rich consumers,  as stated
in Proposition 3. Therefore, the renegotiated price will be lower than the old
price for a larger range of values  of a, when the new majority  is a poor one.
Analytically,  using (4) and (5), the probability  of renegotiation  when group k
is in power in period 1 is equal to:
Pr(R / k) = I+  2*(p(0i),,  I  _  _2- _2  G(_h(_i_p(_)))
2  2e  (2  2 2 )  i'  i
4.2.3  Figuring out how the initial efficiency level drives renegotiation odds
Since regulators tend to be mainly concerned about efficiency, it seems
important to be able to assess the importance of the initial efficiency levels
obtained through the auction for the probability  of having a renegotiation  under
any type of majority.  It also helps in assessing  the impact of regulatory  decision
aiming at changing these efficiency  levels. The formula for Pr(R  / k) allows us
14to address this concern and to test for the impact  of efficiency  changes for both
sources of renegotiation.  Indeed:
dPr(R/k)_  dPr(Rf)  dPr(Rg/k)
do,  dO,  dOj
dPr(Rf)  1  a*  1 a*,
dO,  2e f  ,  2 j 42  43
(+)  ~~~~~(-)
dO,
+  2,  __
4  44  4  44  94444  4
(-)
Notice that the efficiency  parameter  of the firm affects  both the probability  of
renegotiation  driven by the firm, which is determined by s* and the probability
of renegotiation  driven by the government,  determined  both by e  and (0h 
Starting with the probability of having the firms requesting  a renegotiation,
the result allows us to investigate,  in particular,  whether a more efficient firm
(which is the firm that is going to be selected by the auction procedure) is
always  preferred by the two groups of consumers.  It suggests  that changes in the
efficiency of  the  firm  has  two  opposite  effects  on  the  probability  of
renegotiation driven by the firm:
(i)  the  odds of  renegotiation decreases with  the  firm's efficiency (i.e.
increases  with Oj)  because a more efficient  firm has lower costs and this
reduces  the range  of shocks for which the profit is negative;
(ii)  the odds of renegotiation increases with its efficiency  because a more
efficient firm bids a lower price and this increases  the range of shocks
for which the profit is negative.
So, a priori, we cannot know whether  the probability  of renegotiation  driven
by the firm increases  or decreases  with 0i.
15The  same  is  true  for  the  probability  of  renegotiation  initiated  by  the
government.  On  the  one  hand,  this  probability  decreases  with  the  firm's
efficiency because for a more efficient firm:
I . the renegotiated price is smaller and, therefore, the maximum bargaining
power that triggers renegotiation decreases;
2.  the price  in the first period is smaller and therefore the range of demand
shocks for which the firm's profits are positive decreases.
On the other hand, the probability of renegotiation driven by the government
increases with the firm's  efficiency because for a more efficient firm:
1.  the maximum bargaining power that triggers renegotiation  increases;
2.  costs are lower and therefore the range of demand shocks  for which the
firm's profits are positive increases.
5.  Effects of renegotiation on the efficiency-equity trade-off
In this  section we discuss how the model developed so far answers questions
such  as:  Is  there  a  conflict  between  efficiency  and  equity?  How  does
renegotiation  affect rich and poor consumers?  Is there any conflict between the
two groups of consumers?  What  is the role played by the bargaining  power of
the firm in this context?
5.1  Why users may prefer to start with an inefficient firm
One source of trade-off between efficiency and equity arises when users have
a collective  incentive not to prefer to have the most efficient firm winning the
auction  knowing  that  a  renegotiation  is  likely.  If  renegotiation  were  not
possible,  in  other  words,  if  both  parties  could  perfectly  commit  to  the
concession  contract  signed  at  the  auction  stage,  there  would  be  no  possible
conflict  between  efficiency  and  equity.  Indeed,  the  auction  allows  the
government to choose the most efficient firm within the candidates and this firm
charges the lowest possible price, which benefit the poor consumers  in a larger
proportion. And given that the efficiency level is ex ante unknown, there  is no
better way to select the firm.
When the possibility of renegotiation  is opened a conflict between efficiency
and  equity may  appear.  For  instance,  we  know  that  the  welfare  of the  poor
consumers  decreases  when  the firm  initiates  renegotiation,  because  the  price
increases. On the other hand, we also know that this welfare increases when the
government  initiates  renegotiation,  because  in this  case the price  decreases.  In
16the previous Section we showed that the probability of renegotiation might
increase or decrease  with the efficiency  parameter  of the firm.  We want to know
how the poor consumers'  welfare changes  with the efficiency  parameter of the
firm. So suppose that  d(O<  0  and  r(,d  )> 0,  that is, an improvement in
efficiency (a decrease in 6j) improves  the chances of a renegotiation  by the firm
-which  the poor dislike- and reduces those requested by the govemment -
which the poor like. This suggests that poor consumers may prefer to have a
less efficient firm winning the auction to provide opportunities  for government
driven renegotiations  which will lead to realistic tariff reductions requests. But
of course, they have to take into account that a less efficient firm will operate
with a higher  price in the first period,  and also in the second  period if there is no
renegotiation.
To see how the two effects work  together, consider  the following  very simple
(but very particular too) example.  Assume first that (p  = 0, so the government
never asks for renegotiations  and, second, that the probability  of renegotiation
driven by the firm decreases  with 93, that is
dO  -ap  p()+  <0  <  (8) dO  ap  ao
This implies that a more efficient firm will more often have negative  profits
in the first period, and, therefore, will ask for renegotiations more often. But
remember  also  that when the firm  has negative profits,  the  renegotiation  will
always increase the price. Now, the magnitude of the increase in price will
depend on the bargaining  power of the firm at the renegotiation  stage, which is
ex ante unknown. So, consider for instance two firms, characterized  by 91 and
6  = A + dO, dO> 0, so firm I is more efficient than firm 2 and, because of (8),
the probability  of renegotiation  is larger if firm I is selected.
The ex ante expected  welfare for the two groups of consumers  as a ftinction
of 0 is the sum of the excepted  welfare in period 1 given  the price level charged
initially by the firm and of the expected welfare resulting from the price in the
second period  which is determined  by the existence  or absence of renegotiation:
3  If the  only source  of  renegotiations is  negative profits, then  if  the  probability of
renegotiation driven by the firm increases with 9, all consumers will always prefer the most
efficient firm. Indeed, a more efficient firm will charge a smaller price in the first period, which
is good, and will trigger  renegotiation  less often, which is also good.
17EW1(O)=  W,(p(9  0,£  )-+  f  W  V(),  0  -
f  2.-  ~(6)2e
+ |  lbh  (0, W,  a), 0, W  ()&)-d  a
0  -e  2
EW 2 (9)  =  JW2 (p(),  0,£  +  f  JAX00g)
26e()  26-
, s (a)
+f  f  W2 bhR(O,  W,a}0,  W()&)2gda
where  PhR  is an increasing  function of a, and q(p) is an increasing  function of
The first term is the expected  welfare in the first period given that the firm
charges a price equal to p(9). The second term is the expected welfare in the
second period if there is no renegotiation,  so the price is still equal to p(9).
Finally, the third term is the expected welfare in the second period if there is
renegotiation, in which case the price will be equal to phR and a  is ex ante
unknown.
We are interested in how the expected welfare would change if there is a
small decrease in the efficiency  level (a small increase in 9, the marginal cost).
dEW,  I  6 WI (P  W)  dp  8WI  d6_
dO  - ap  dO  a9  126
6 oL  p  dO  a9  ''  2e
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Four effects of Oon the expected welfare can be distinguished. The first three
are the classical effects: an increase in Oreduces welfare in each period, whether
there  is  renegotiation  or  not,  both  because  the  firm's  costs  are  higher  and
because  the  price  of the  good  in any  case  is also  higher 4. These  effects  are
represented  by  the  first  3 terms, which  are negative,  implying  that,  with  the
same  probability  of  renegotiation,  both  groups  of  consumers  would  have
preferred firm  1 over firm 2.
The fourth effect is given by the fact that when  0 increases the probability of
renegotiation,  given the assumption made in (8), decreases, decreasing the range
of demand  shocks  for which the price is high (equal to the  renegotiated price)
and, therefore, welfare  increases, meaning that both groups of consumers  prefer
firm 2 over firm  1.5
Therefore,  the  net  effect  of  0 over  the  expected  welfare  can  be  either
negative,  in which  case efficiency is always better, or positive,  in which  case a
less efficient firm might be preferable, if the fourth effect is large enough.
The  fourth  effect  will  be  large,  and  hence  a  less  efficient  firm  will  be
preferred,  when  the  bargaining  power  distribution  function  g(a)  is  biased
4In  the case of the rich consumers  it is not always  true that an increase in price will reduce
welfare. Indeed, if the price is lower  than pi,  which is the price that maximizes rich consumers'
welfare, a small increase in price will increase  welfare. Indeed, if R%  is close  to 0, pi' is close to
the monopoly  price and the price without  renegotiation  is smaller than p,  . We will assume that
in those cases, the direct decrease in welfare due to an increase in 0 completely offsets the
increase  due to an increase  in the price, so the net effect is negative.
5 Of  course,  if the  probability  of renegotiation  decreases  with  the  efficiency  of  the  firm
> 0 ), this fourth effect would go in the same direction as the first three and more efficiency
would be always better for consumers.
19towards large values of a, because  more weight  is put on the cases for which the
increase in the price is the largest.  In practice,  this bias exists when competition
is limited on the supply side (as is the case in the water sector and to a lesser
extent in the power, port and railways  sectors,  for instance where the number of
global players  is such that competition  for the market seldom  results in no more
than 2-3 bidders). 6
In addition, to the  equity efficiency trade-off just  described, there is an
underlying distributional  conflict between rich and poor. For P2  small enough
(i.e. when the poor rule significantly) 7, we have that  dwl  > | dW 1 ,  and, therefore,
there are cases in which the poor consumers  prefer firm 2 over firm I while the
reverse is true for the rich consumers.  The efficiency-equity  trade-off continues
to hold as well since  the auction procedure  will always select firm 1.
The bottom line is that  we can conclude  that the efficiency  level is not the
unique  relevant parameter driving the  selection of  a  firm  to  operate a
concession,  equity issues must be taken into account as well and may in fact
have to prevail over efficiency  consideration.  When renegotiation  driven by the
firm is an issue (when the uncertainty  about market conditions is high) a more
efficient  firm can end-up operating  with a quite high price after renegotiations.
5.2 When rich and poor consumers don't see eye to eye
The distributional conflict just eluded suggests that it is also important to
understand more generally the differences in efficiency outcomes since they
may result in conflicts between the two groups of consumers. In particular,  we
should be interested  in trying  to classify  the situations  in which rich consumers
and poor consumers will agree or disagree about the situation they prefer the
most.
The possible situations are as follows:
1. When at the auction stage there is a rich majority (/1* > 1/2) and at the end
of period 1:
6Any  time we can expect a close  relationship  between the operators and the government  (or
a politically driven regulator), collusion is a risk; the fewer the alternatives,  the stronger the
firm's bargaining  power and hence the stronger  the risks of collusion.
7 The exact condition is that fl  < I +  I(')  id 1,  In particular, the condition is satisfied
when  poor consumers  are majority.
20(a) The  winning firm  i,  has  negative profits,  so  renegotiation occurs
whatever  the majority  in period 2 and the price of the good increases.
(b) The firm has positive profits and in  period 2 there is again a  rich
majority,  so no renegotiation  can happen,  whatever  the value of ai.
(c) The firm has positive  profits but in period 2 there is a poor majority, so
renegotiation occurs  if  the  firm's  bargaining power  is  low  enough
(a,  <  d2  ) and the price of the good decreases.
2. When at the auction stage  there is a poor majority  (J3  * < 1/2) and, at the end
of period 1:
(a) The firm has negative profits, so renegotiation occurs whatever the
majority in period  2 and the price of the good increases.
(b) The firm has positive profits but in period 2 there is a rich majority, so
renegotiation occurs  if  the  firm's  bargaining power is  low enough
(a,  <  e&) and the price of the good decreases.
(c) The firm has positive profits and in  period 2 there is again a poor
majority,  so no renegotiation  can happen,  whatever  the value of ai.
Cases I  a and 2a show that if the firm has negative profits in the first period,
both groups of consumers are better off when poor consumers  win the election
and rule during the second period. This is because the magnitude of the price
increase -and  the price will increase after renegotiations under any type of
majority- is always lower when the poor are in charge in the second period.
Indeed, according to Proposition 3, the renegotiated price will be smaller if
A* < 1/2 (see Figure 1). Furthermore,  the probability of being in one of these
two  cases  is  the  same because the  price  charged in  the  first  period  is
independent  of 3j  .
Cases lb  and 2c show that if the firm has positive profits and there is no
change in majority, whatever  the majority, no renegotiation  happens whatever
the bargaining power of the firm. Moreover, given our assumption that the
probability of preserving  the majority is independent of ,81*,  both cases also
arise with the same  probability.
The most interesting  cases are Ic and 2b when the firm has positive profits
but there is a change in majority.  In these two cases, renegotiation  occurs if the
21bargaining power of the firm is small enough. According  to Figure 2, &, < &2
and therefore Pr(a 1 < &1  )  < Pr(a, < &2) and renegotiation occurs more often
when there is a poor majority in the second period. Furthermore,  even when
a,  <  d>  < & 2 ,  so renegotiation  occurs under any majority,  the renegotiated  price
will be lower in case Ic than in case 2b, because poor consumers are more
concerned with a decrease in price. Without ambiguity,  poor consumers will
prefer case Ic to case 2b. Rich consumers will also prefer case Ic as long as
p 2 R(afA  ) >p1*(6  ).  On the other hand, if &j < ac <  Ka2,  renegotiation  will occur
in case I  c, while it would not in case 2b.
The conflict between rich and poor consumers arises as follows. When the
rich win the election,  for f*  small enough  p *(Oi)  is larger than the renegotiated
price obtained with a poor majority because  as 2  goes to 0,  pi *(&i)  approaches
the monopoly  price. If this were the case, the group of rich consumers prefers
not to  renegotiate and maintain a price closer to the monopoly price. This
behavior hurts the poor, which would have bargained  a much lower price if they
had won the election and is thus the main source of conflict in the second
period.
A final source of distributional conflict is that the loss incurred by poor
consumers when the price is higher than the Ramsey  price is always larger than
the  one  incurred by rich consumers because the  latter group receives the
increased  profits of the firm.
6.  Concluding  remarks
In this paper we analyze the possible sources of contract renegotiation and
their impact on the efficiency-equity  trade-off in non-competitive  markets in
which regulation  by average cost pricing cannot be implemented  because there
is incomplete  information  about  the firm's costs.
To do this, we presented a model of incomplete  contracting for concession
award in which neither the government nor the firm consider ex  ante the
possibility of  renegotiation, yet renegotiation happens. Competition for the
contract through an auction ensures that the consumers  benefit by a price that is
lower than the monopoly price and allows the government to select the firm
with the lowest costs. We assume that once the firm has started to produce, the
marginal cost of the firm can be inferred, so at the renegotiation stage the
government and the firm share the same information. The government still
cannot always force the firm to charge a price equal to the average cost because
22at  this  stage  the  firm  has  acquired  some bargaining  power  and  therefore  the
government  is not able to extract all the rents from it.
The  model  provides  possible  explanations  for  the  various  types  of
renegotiations  that have  been  observed  in the  last  decade  and  offers  testable
results.  First,  the  probability  of  election-driven  renegotiations  inducing
reductions  in tariffs is larger if: (i) in the first period the "rich" consumers  (i.e.
the co-owners of the operating firms) are in power, (ii) the operators are making
profits,  (iii) the  "poor" take over after a change in government  and/or (iv) the
government  expects  to have  a strong bargaining  power. Second,  whatever the
bargaining  power and the marginal cost of the firm, bargaining  with the group
of poor consumers  will achieve a lower price than  bargaining  with a group  of
rich  consumers.  Third,  the  smaller  the  group  of  rich  in  the  population,  the
higher  the  chances  of  having  high  prices  because  they  receive  the  whole
increase  in the  profit  of the  firm  while  they  lose  a  small  proportion  of the
reduction  in the consumer  surplus. This implies that conflicts  between rich and
poor  consumers  are more  likely to  occur the larger the  relative  power  of the
poor at the time of renegotiation. Fourth, the expected direction of the effects of
changes in the firm's  marginal cost on the probability of renegotiation  depends
on  a  set  of  factors  with  opposing  sign  and  is  hence  an  empirical  matter
reflecting  the  relative  strength  of these  factors.  Fifth, the  perverse  effects  of
excessive  bargaining  power  by  the  firm  tend  to  penalize  the  poor  relatively
more  because they pay a higher price without  benefiting by the increase  in the
firm's  profits.
In terms of policy advise, the model suggests that if the fear of renegotiation
is  a  major  concern,  efficiency  is  not  the  only  variable  that  matters  when
selecting a firm to operate a concession.  Indeed, consumers  may want to award
the  concession  to  a  less  efficient  firm  in  order to  reduce  the  probability  of
renegotiation  since  lower  probabilities  of firm  driven  renegotiations  (dues  to
demand shocks  for instance) are associated with higher welfare  levels. Second,
the model  suggests also  that a  "benevolent,  welfare  maximizing  government'"
should  make  every  possible  effort  to  balance  the  bargaining  power  of  its
regulators  with that of the operators to ensure a fair treatment of all users. One
of the actions to take, and certainly not the least important, is to minimize  the
possibility of collusion/corruption  between the firm and the government units in
charge  of  the  renegotiations  and  who  may  not  have  the  same  degree  of
benevolence.  Reducing  bargaining  power  will  also  reduce  strategic  bids  and
low-balling  by  firms  convinced  that  they  can win  any  renegotiation  and  get
closer  to monopoly  prices  ex-post.  Third, any  policy  instrument  that  reduces
23demand uncertainty  will be in the interest of all users but in particular  the poor.
Indeed, the implicit insurance  paid by selecting a somewhat  inefficient firm at
the auction reduces renegotiations  due to negative demand shocks, which in
turn leaves the poor better off.
In order to refine some of the results, additional research could explore the
following ideas. First, we have considered  the bargaining power of the firm as
an exogenous  parameter.  In practice,  it depends on several variables such as the
owners of the firm,  the political interference  with the choice of bidders resulting
from tied bilateral aid, the level of profits or of sunk costs, etc. A more careful
study of the potential effects of each one of these factors seems appropriate.
Second, there is a reputation  effect that is not captured in the model. In order to
avoid the kind of strategic  behavior  aforementioned,  the government  can build a
reputation  of being tough regarding renegotiations.  This would have a dynamic
positive effect on welfare, by avoiding underbidding and, therefore, ex post
non-desired increases in price. A final additional direction for improvement
could be the modeling of the distributional  payoffs of insurance  mechanisms  to
protect from demand uncertainty.
247.  Appendix
Proof of  Proposition 1.  We are  looking for  a  subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium  of the game. Each firm bids according  to the first order condition:
(Pi  )+  (Pi - Oi) d'  (pj)-(N-  I)  fArl(p))  (Pi - 0J4(pj)-I  O (9)
dp  I __-  -- 0'(  i) 
Now we need to verify that a solution of equation 9 satisfies  d'P > 0  at the
symmetric  equilibrium,  which means that the lowest price will be offered by the
firm with the lowest marginal  cost.
At the symmetric equilibrium pi = pi(9,) and p-I (pj) =  O, so condition 9
writes:
(N-1)  -(0i)  _(0_)_0J(P(_)__I
I - F(j  )  p'(O  )  0)
q_(P(Oi))+  pO(°j)-Oj  ) d(p(Oj  )), >o
dp
where the inequality holds because the price is lower than the monopoly
price whenever  N > 1. If the price were higher  than the monopoly  price, the firm
could increase both the expected profit and the probability  of renegotiation by
decreasing  the price.
This also implies that the expected profit of the firm is strictly positive for
any de,  so the price is lower than the Ramsey  price. If this were not the case, the
expected profit of the firm would be negative, and therefore, it would win by
bidding  the Ramsey  price.
Proof of Proposition  2. a) Suppose  first that A* > 1/2 so at the renegotiation
stage there is a rich majority. Because of Nash bargaining, we know that the
optimal renegotiation  price will solve the following  problem:
25Imax[W,  (p)]I'-'  [T(P)]a'
p
subject to
t(p)  2  0
So, using the definitions  of WI  and 7r and remembering  that S'(q(p))=  p  we
obtain the first order condition, FOC,  dp=  d  w (P)]'p  [r(p)f  =
- (I - s)(-  ?p+  P-  ) dp (P)]
dp
Rearranging terms, equation 2 can be found. The constraint is binding for
a, = O  if pP  (0.,  ) > p;  (9,,  ,)  and is not binding for any a, E (0,1].
b) Now suppose that fi2 < 1/2 so at the renegotiation stage there is a poor
majority.  The optimal  renegotiation  price will solve the following  problem:
Imax[W 2 (p)] ri  [IT(p)T'
p
subject to
So, using the definitions of W 2 and ,rand remembering  that S'(q(p))= p  we
obtain the first order condition,  FOC2 (p) = d  d6' 2(p)I  [  = 0
(I - a, XI  - A2 k(p)
=x  Wcj2((P)[(p  - J)d? (P)+  q(p)]
dp
26Rearranging terms, equation 3 can be found. The constraint is always binding
for a,  0  O and is not binding for any a,  E (0,1].
Proof  of Proposition 3. For comparative  static, we  compute the derivative
of the first order condition with respect to the parameter that changes. To
R  R)  (dPh  aFoc,,j(PR simplify notations, we will call qh  q(Ph  ).  Thus, sign  (dah  sign(  'aV'h  h)
for any parameter a.
WFOC,  dql  -I  +a  R
89,  dp  t  z  ;Fp 
cdp  q]  ]qR 1 (R)o
81OC  _  c/p  1  R)_@
aoI  I(?  i)  q  p  ) 
Dx  <4q  +[(41  -9  i  +]  1  0R
RFOC,  I  dp;  R  1d  W,  p,  )_  )
+-  I-a,  - <0  i  dp  R]  >  0
X  W~  ~  p  R  )(R  )
F  FOC 2 d-a  W2 ?  R)dqR
89(i  _  4 i  p)  dp
aFOC a  R@  Ro ) d +  R2  ]2  W@I  >P  °
27---  = a i  [(P2  .1  -- d  +q 2  ]  @ 
81  dp  j  )R)
aFOC 2 R,  R  R  V  dq  j  w 2(j2p)
(  _  - -,  22  +  @  q)>
+±(1-a,I  = °
Which gives our result.
To show that p2R  <￿p 1 R  it suffices to show that the first order condition when
there  is a poor majority evaluated at p1R  is negative,  meaning  that, decreasing
the  price  will  increase  the  objective  function.  That  is,  we  will  show  that
FOC 2(p 1R) '<O
F  FOC  R  __  R  -2
d  2R)  "I *)rdR
Now, taking  into account that, by  definition of s 1 R,  FOC1(pj)  =  0, we can
replace and we obtain:
+(I-aSaR",p  RR  =0  *
Finally, using the definition of Wi(pjR),  we have
(+)
28So, FOC 2(piR) < 0, meaning  that 2R ￿p 1 R.
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